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COSTING METHODOLOGY
A general model of the impact of absenteeism on employers
and employees
Mark V. Paulya,*, Sean Nicholsona, Judy Xua, Dan Polskyb, Patricia M. Danzona,
James F. Murrayc and Marc L. Bergerc
aHealth Care Systems Department, The Wharton School, 3641 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6218, USA
bDivision of General Internal Medicine, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA
cOutcomes Research & Management, Merck & Co., Inc., USA
Summary
Most studies on the indirect costs of an illness and the cost eﬀectiveness of a medical intervention or employer-
sponsored wellness program assume that the value of reducing the number of days employees miss from work due to
illness is the wage rate. This paper presents a general model to examine the magnitude and incidence of costs
associated with absenteeism under alternative assumptions regarding the size of the ﬁrm, the production function,
the nature of the ﬁrm’s product, and the competitiveness of the labor market. We conclude that the cost of lost work
time can be substantially higher than the wage when perfect substitutes are not available to replace absent workers
and there is team production or a penalty associated with not meeting an output target. In the long run, workers are
likely to bear much of the incidence of the costs associated with absenteeism, and therefore be the likely beneﬁciaries
of any reduction in absenteeism. Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Introduction
There is a growing interest in quantifying the
beneﬁts to employers of programs that reduce the
number of days their employees miss from work
because of illness [1,2]. If these beneﬁts are
suﬃciently large, employers may be able to justify
oﬀering better health insurance policies to their
employees and implementing wellness programs.
At present, almost all cost of illness studies and
cost eﬀectiveness analyses of medical interventions
use the wage rate to estimate the beneﬁt of reduced
absenteeism [3–6]. This approach is often based on
the so-called ‘human capital’ approach to valuing
health, in which the loss of a healthy day
represents the loss of production whose value in
competitive labor markets equals the money wage.
In this paper, we argue that such approaches are
based on assumptions that are not generally
appropriate for modeling employer decisions on
employment or impacts on ﬁrm output, and we
examine the cost of work loss under alternative
assumptions. On the one hand, we show that in a
general long-run model with full employment – so
that employer and societal perspectives on cost
coincide – wages represent a lower bound for
losses from a day of missed work that could be
much larger than the wage per day. On the other
hand, in some circumstances the long-run beneﬁt
from reduced work loss is captured, not by the
*Correspondence to: Health Care Systems Department, The Wharton School, 3641 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6218,
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employer, but by the employee. However, even in
this case, it will be rational for employers to
implement any cost-eﬀective program that reduces
work loss. Thus, traditional measurement methods
are likely to misestimate the true gain to employers
and to society from implementing policies that
would reduce absenteeism. If there is less than full
employment, then these conclusions will be mod-
iﬁed, but it will still be true that there are costs of
lost work time that are positive and exceed friction
costs, that vary across production processes and
labor markets, and that ought to be taken into
account in the analysis from either an employer or
societal perspective.
Our objective in this paper is, therefore, to
specify a more general model of the incidence and
eﬀects of reductions in the lost work time. We
identify characteristics of ﬁrms and markets that
determine whether the gross beneﬁts will be large
or small, and how they will be distributed between
employer and employee. We provide a categoriza-
tion of combinations of characteristics that can
help to predict how large the gain will be for a
given employer or a set of employers. We
also consider how employer and societal perspec-
tives will diﬀer when there is less than full
employment.
Cost of illness studies estimate the sum of the
direct and indirect costs of an illness [3,5,7]. Direct
costs include the medical costs of treating indivi-
duals who have the illness; indirect costs include
the value of the work loss that results when these
individuals are absent from work or experience
diminished productivity at work while recovering
from the illness. This paper focuses on the
marginal cost of an absence due to illness and
the marginal beneﬁt of an intervention that
reduces absenteeism, rather than the average cost
as in cost of illness studies. Focusing on the
marginal cost of absenteeism and the incidence of
these costs will help identify parties that have an
incentive to implement programs to improve
health.
The basic model: a single homogeneous
input
For our initial discussion, we present a model in
which workers are hired in competitive labor
markets under full employment; the money wage
is determined as the equilibrium price in that
market. Firms and workers are assumed to be
identical a priori, although workers and work-
forces will experience variation in actual work loss
days. Workers obtain the same utility whether they
are well or ill on a workday; the additional leisure
associated with time oﬀ is exactly oﬀset by pain
and discomfort. The perspective, therefore, is that
of ﬁrm owners and their workers; there are no
(non-transitionally) unemployed people whose
costs and beneﬁts need to be considered. We begin
by analyzing a ﬁrm with a simple production
function that can store its output at zero cost and
does not oﬀer sick leave beneﬁts. We then consider
alternate scenarios that may alter the appropriate
measure of the cost of absenteeism.
In the benchmark model, ﬁrms hire homoge-
neous workers (L) to produce a product (Y) that
can be stored at zero cost. With low inventory
costs, there are no penalties if a ﬁrm’s output
varies from day to day due to variations in the
number of absent workers. If all the workers
scheduled to work actually show up, the relatively
high output for that day increases inventory.
Conversely, if an unusually large number of
workers are ill on a particular day, output is
relatively low and inventory is depleted. The costs
of absenteeism will be smaller in this production
scenario than in any other because ﬁrms will not
need to make potentially expensive adjustments to
minimize the short-term eﬀects of absenteeism due
to illness. Data processing, billing, and telemarket-
ing ﬁrms may be characterized by such a produc-
tion function. If a data processor is ill and misses
work, the work can usually be completed by the
absent worker at a later date without any loss in
the ﬁrm’s revenue.
A ﬁrm with the production function described
above would hire workers until the marginal
product is equal to the market wage of w per
day, which is assumed to be determined by worker
productivity or demand elsewhere in the local
economy:
Y ¼ f ðLÞ
MRP ¼ pf 0 ¼ w
where p is the price of the product, f 0 is the
worker’s marginal product, and MRP is the
marginal revenue product of labor. In the bench-
mark model, there is no sick leave policy; employ-
ees receive a wage w for each day they actually
work and zero if they are absent due to an illness.
Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Health Econ. 11: 221–231 (2002)
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When an employee is absent, the ﬁrm’s revenue
and labor costs are both lower by the amount w,
the daily wage. Employees bear the costs asso-
ciated with absenteeism and would reap all the
gains associated with reduced work loss. If the ﬁrm
institutes a program that improves the health of its
workers and reduces absenteeism by one day per
worker, then an employee’s annual income would
increase by approximately w. (We ignore the
possibility that mild illness reduces the productiv-
ity of those who do show up for work, the so-
called ‘presenteeism’ eﬀect; we also ignore any
eﬀects on the market equilibrium wage per day
from changes in the aggregate supply of (healthy)
working days.)
We now adapt the model to account for sick day
beneﬁts. Most ﬁrms provide sick day beneﬁts to
their employees by allowing workers to be paid for
a certain number of days when they are absent due
to an illness. Paid wages are ﬁxed for a given time
period (e.g. a year) and are not aﬀected by the
number of days a worker is actually absent. We
assume that sick days are not predictable for any
individual worker, although the average number
of sick days can be predicted for a large number of
similar workers.
The existence and persistence of this fringe
beneﬁt is not due to employer altruism. Instead, it
can be explained by a rational desire of risk averse
workers to have the (large) ﬁrm pool their
individual risks and insure against the loss of
wage income due to the unpredictable nature of
illness. Such workers are willing to accept lower
wages per day actually worked in return for a
guarantee of payment when illness strikes. Con-
sider ﬁrms that want to set a wage rate for a year
that consists of 250 work days. All ﬁrms expect
workers to miss an average of m days per year due
to illness, and their expectations are correct. In a
competitive labor market, the annual wage rate
will be set equal to the marginal revenue product
of (250m) days, or wð250mÞ, where w is both
the marginal revenue product of labor and the
wage per day actually worked, as determined by
the market. Spreading the worker’s marginal
revenue product over the 250 work days in the
year yields an average wage per day paid of
w ¼ wð250mÞ=250. Thus, employers do not
‘give’ sick days; workers pay for them in the form
of lower wages per worked day, but workers prefer
this arrangement to one of positive payment per
day worked and zero payment per day missed
because this arrangement averages out the varia-
tion across workers in the numbers of days missed
due to illness.
The cost to the ﬁrm when a worker is absent due
to illness is the worker’s marginal revenue product,
which is equal to the wage per day actually worked
(w). A program that decreases m by 1 day will
increase the value of the ﬁrm’s output by w, which
is moderately larger than the wage rate per day
paid (w), if m is small. Even at this very simple
level, the wage per day paid is an underestimation
of the value to the ﬁrm of reducing m, but the wage
per day worked is an accurate measure.
Who receives the gains when a ﬁrm that oﬀers
such a sick leave policy institutes a program that
reduces work loss due to illness? A key issue in
answering this question is whether other employers
can identify or determine that the illness prob-
ability of a set of workers has fallen. Let us ﬁrst
consider the most transparent (though, we will
argue, not always the most realistic) case in which
the treated workers’ improved health is observable
by and permanently ‘transferable’ to any new
employer. In Gary Becker’s classic sense, this
health capital is general rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc
[8]. Examples of this kind of treatment might be
smoking cessation or weight loss programs. We
ignore for the moment laws that might forbid
discrimination in wages, and instead assume that
employers are free to pay any mutually agreed-
upon wage; employers are permitted to pay higher
wages to workers with better health habits. If
treatment is successful, then treated workers will
be more productive for a long period of time; they
can be identiﬁed as such. In this case, it is clear
that these workers will receive higher wage oﬀers
from competing employers (to reﬂect their im-
proved health), which should increase the wage
they receive from their current employer. In
equilibrium, the beneﬁts from improved health
will be almost entirely captured by the healthier
employees (in the form of an increase of w=250 in
the wage per day paid) and not by their employ-
ers.a Of course, in the short run, before the wage
contracts are renegotiated, employers would be
likely to capture the beneﬁts of reduced work loss.
This example also demonstrates the necessary
conditions for employers to translate health
improvements directly into higher employer proﬁts
rather than higher employee wages. The health
intervention must be one that is secret or diﬃcult
to detect, and/or impossible for other employers to
reproduce. Hidden, unique health improvement
programs are the ones for which the traditional
A General Model of the Impact of Absenteeism 223
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method of measuring the gain to employers from
cost-eﬀective work loss reduction programs are
most appropriate, but easily observable and easily
replicable programs will largely beneﬁt workers in
the form of higher wages.b
For example, suppose that one cause of missed
work is substance abuse. If an employer can
discover a low cost and eﬀective treatment
program that is diﬃcult for other employers to
copy (unique) and whose beneﬁcial eﬀects are hard
for other employers to observe (hidden), the
employer needs to pay no more than the prevailing
wage to the now-more-productive treated workers,
and yet can beneﬁt from their increased produc-
tivity. If, in contrast, the low-cost program can be
easily copied, all other employers will be expected
to do so; average worker productivity will rise and
with it the wage. Or, alternatively, if the innovat-
ing ﬁrm’s more productive workers can be
identiﬁed in the labor market and the treatment
program has a permanent eﬀect on the worker’s
health, their wages will rise.
The potential failure of employers to capture in
productivity all the long-run beneﬁts of cost-
eﬀective interventions to reduce work loss should
not, however, eliminate their incentive to institute
such interventions. The reason why employers
provide employee beneﬁts in competitive labor
markets is presumably because doing so is the best
way to attract and retain employees; indeed, in the
fully competitive model any employer who does
not provide the beneﬁt will be driven out of
business by higher labor costs than those of his
competitors who do provide beneﬁts. Concretely,
if an intervention provides improved productivity
beneﬁts, then employers will provide that inter-
vention as long as these beneﬁts exceed the
program’s cost. As usual in competitive markets,
there are strong incentives for ﬁrms to take actions
that temporarily reward the ﬁrm that takes the
initiative but ultimately beneﬁt workers or con-
sumers.
This view also suggests that employers ought to
value providing coverage for care that will be
eﬀective for health in the future even for workers
with observable health improvements who might
move to another ﬁrm. Since such beneﬁts will
make workers more productive at any new ﬁrm,
workers should be willing to accept wages lowered
by the cost of the beneﬁt in the current period at
the ﬁrm paying for the care, to reﬂect their higher
future earnings either at that ﬁrm or at some
alternative future employer. It is well known that
workers do accept lower wages when employers
oﬀer valued health beneﬁts [9]. The ability of the
employers to observe the potential health im-
provement is obviously key to this conclusion, but
it does mean that eﬀective care with a long payoﬀ
period nevertheless, ought, to be valued by high
turnover ﬁrms and their employees.
We now consider whether the cost to the ﬁrm of
work loss and the incidence of this cost is diﬀerent
when ﬁrms pay workers an annual salary and
require them to make up during what would
otherwise be their leisure time for any work missed
due to illness. In a competitive labor market, the
annual salary would need to be suﬃciently high to
generate the same utility for the worker as the
compensation package in other ﬁrms, where
workers are paid when they are absent due
to illness but do not have to make up for the
work. In eﬀect, the ﬁrst ﬁrm must pay more
(compared to the other ﬁrms) in salary because it
requires more work, some of it at inconvenient
times. Such a policy transforms unpredictable
illness into unpredictable work on weekends or
at night. If workers derive utility from income and
leisure and the number of sick days are exo-
genous, workers would require an annual salary s
such that
Uðwð250mÞ; LÞ ¼ Uðs; LmÞ
At the optimal number of days worked per year,
assumed here to be 250, the utility of a day of
leisure would equal the foregone wage (w). If the
utility function is additively separable, then the
required salary (s) to attract employees will be at
least 250w. The cost to salaried workers of an
absence is the value of the leisure time they use to
make up for the work they miss. A program that
reduces m by one day has no (long run) eﬀect on
the ﬁrm’s output, but it does increase the utility of
the salaried worker by increasing leisure by one
day. As before, a salaried worker bears the
incidence of the cost of an absence and reaps the
beneﬁts of a reduction in absenteeism.
These conclusions need not hold in a short-run
situation in which absence rates change but wages
have yet to adjust. For instance, if the absence rate
increases by one day in a ﬁrm that requires
workers to make up for lost work but wages have
yet to adjust to a higher chance of inconvenient
work, then the cost to the employer would be less
than the daily wage per worker. However, once
wages adjust, the cost will always be equal to or
greater than the wage.
M.V. Pauly et al.224
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The main conclusions from the benchmark
model are:
(1) Even with very simple production functions,
the value to the ﬁrm and/or to the worker of
avoiding a work loss day will equal the wage
per day worked.
(2) In competitive labor markets, some of the
beneﬁts from reduced work loss could fall to
workers in the form of higher wages and/or
more convenient work times – depending on
the nature of the health improvement, worker
preferences and labor supply elasticities, and
the knowledge structure in the labor market.
(3) In a competitive labor market, ﬁrms will have
incentives to institute programs that reduce
absenteeism even if their employees reap the
beneﬁts of the lower work loss.
Team production
Thus far in our analysis, the daily wage has been
assumed to be an accurate indicator of the relative
cost of work loss (across jobs and ﬁrms). Now we
consider alternative forms of the production
process and the ﬁrm’s reaction to work loss in
which the value of avoiding lost work time can be
much greater than the daily wage. There are two
necessary general conditions for the consequences
to the ﬁrm that are greater than the worker’s wage.
One is that the eﬀect of the worker’s absence on
ﬁrm revenues and/or output is greater than the
value of the worker’s daily output. The other is
that it is not costless to ﬁnd a perfect substitute for
an absent worker.
Even if output, once produced, can be stored,
unexpected absences can have serious conse-
quences if production of output requires that a
set of team members show up at the same time.
When a member of a team is absent, he aﬀects the
marginal product of the entire team, rather than
just his own marginal product. Consider an
extreme form of team production where a ﬁrm
employs capital (K) and two labor inputs (L1 and
L2) in a Leontief production function to produce
output Y :
Y ¼ minfaL1; bL2; dKg
The terms a, b, and c are productivity parameters.
The cost, C, of producing output Y is
C ¼ Yðw1=aþ w2=bþ v=dÞ
where v is the rental price per unit of capital, and
w1 and w2 are the wages of the two distinct labor
inputs. Consider a case where a ¼ 1, b ¼ 2, d ¼ 3,
and output sells for a price of $10 per unit. If the
ﬁrm wants to produce six units of output, then it
needs to assemble a team consisting of six type-one
workers, three type-two workers, and two units of
capital. If w1 ¼ $4, w2 ¼ $6, and v ¼ $9, then the
team will be paid its marginal revenue product of
$60 and the ﬁrm will have economic rents of zero.
Consider ﬁrst the extreme case in which there
is what might be called ‘team-speciﬁc human
capital’; no worker new to the team can be
eﬀectively substituted for an absent team member.
If one of the three type-two workers scheduled to
work does not show up, the remaining team would
only be able to produce four rather than six units
of output. (We assume that the production
function is such that the other workers cannot
compensate for the lost team members; they may
not have their skills, or full production may
require two extra pairs of hands.) The cost of the
absence would be $20, or the value of the lost
output. Alternatively, one can think of the cost of
the absence as the sum of the marginal product of
the absent worker (1 $6), the marginal product
of the idle type-one workers (2 $4), and the
marginal product of the idle capital (23 $9) caused
by the absence of the type-two worker. With team
production, the cost of an absence ($20 in this
example) can clearly exceed the wage of the absent
factor ($6 in this example). When setting annual
compensation, the ﬁrm should reduce each team
member’s compensation by the expected cost of his
absences. If a type-two worker is expected to miss
5 days per year, then their annual pay should be
$100, or (5 $20), less than if he were present
every day.
The value of the entire team’s lost production,
$20 in the above example, represents an upper
bound to the cost of an absence under team
production. The ﬁrm’s managers might be able to
take steps to mitigate the eﬀects of an unexpected
absence. One possibility is for the ﬁrm to
substitute a new worker for the absent type-two
worker, thereby allowing the remaining members
of the team to continue to produce some output.
Whether it is worthwhile to hire a substitute
depends on the substitute’s impact on output and
her cost. Consider a situation where the substitute
(L3) is less productive because she does not have
the team-speciﬁc skills of the team member she is
replacing (L2), but her presence does not alter the
A General Model of the Impact of Absenteeism 225
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productivity of the other inputs. The ‘replacement’
team’s production function becomes:
Y ¼ minfaL1; hL3; dKg
where h is the productivity parameter of the
replacement worker. The new cost function
becomes
C ¼ Yðw1=aþ w3=hþ v=dÞ
where w3 is the replacement worker’s wage.
When a ﬁrm decides whether to hire the
replacement worker, w1 and v are sunk costs;
the team members made idle by the absence of the
type-two worker will be paid whether or not a
replacement is hired. The replacement worker will
therefore be hired if w3=h5p, where p is the output
price. In the example above, if the replacement
worker’s wage is $6 and p is $10, then the
replacement worker will be hired if h > 0:6. That
is, if the replacement worker is at least 30% as
productive as the absent worker, then the replace-
ment will be hired. If this condition does not hold,
the ﬁrm may choose to invest money to cross-train
employees so they can more ably ﬁll in for absent
team members. This would imply that the para-
meter h is a function of the amount of money the
ﬁrm invests in team-speciﬁc training. Replacing
absent team members will be less likely to occur in
a situation where there is a substantial amount of
team-speciﬁc human capital. More generally, the
cost of an absence will be the incremental cost of
hiring a suﬃcient number of replacement workers
to maintain the team’s target output. If it is
optimal to hire a replacement worker, then the
expected cost of an absence will be reduced, and
the team members’ wages will rise relative to a
situation where the non-absent team members
remain idle.
The Leontief production function described
above is an extreme form of team production
where workers of diﬀerent types cannot be
substituted for one another. With less rigid team
production, a ﬁrm could pay team members
overtime when a team member is absent to ensure
that output is maintained at Y. Alternatively, the
ﬁrm could build into each team member’s salary
suﬃcient compensation for them to agree to work
harder when a team member is absent in order to
maintain output at its required level. In either case,
the cost of an absence must be larger than the
wage of the absent worker and smaller than the
value of the reduction in the team’s output caused
by the absent worker. If team members are willing
to permanently cover for a worker for less than the
worker’s wage, then the ﬁrm will replace the worker
and raise the remaining team members’ wages.
We conclude, therefore, that when there is a
team production and substantial team-speciﬁc
human capital, the value of lost output to the ﬁrm
from an absence will exceed the wage per day of
the absent worker. The loss could be as large as the
total output of the team, but could be reduced if
replacements are available who are either inexpen-
sive or are reasonably close substitutes for team
members.
Penalties for output shortfalls
The other situation where the cost associated with
work loss may be much larger than the wage of the
absent worker is when a ﬁrm incurs a penalty if
output falls below a critical level for a given time
interval (e.g. a day). Consider a ﬁrm that uses a
single homogeneous labor input in an individual
(non-team) production process and incurs a
penalty for output shortfalls. For example, depart-
ment store sales clerks answer customer questions
and process sales. If one clerk is absent and no
replacement is available, queues will form at the
functioning registers and some potential customers
might leave. Disappointed customers not only do
not buy on a day they cannot be served, but they
might take their future business elsewhere. If a
replacement worker can be hired at the same wage
as the absent worker, then the cost of the work loss
will be the wage per day paid, as before. If,
however, the absent worker has substantial ﬁrm-
speciﬁc human capital and is costly to replace, the
cost to the ﬁrm of the absence will be greater than
the sales clerk’s wage.
The costs associated with work loss can be
particularly large at service ﬁrms where the
inventory is often perishable. If an airline ﬂight is
cancelled because a pilot is absent, for example,
the airline will never be able to recoup the lost
revenue. The department store, on the other hand,
can still sell the inventory that accumulated when
the sales clerk was absent. In both cases, dis-
satisﬁed customers can aﬀect future revenue so
there is a penalty associated with output shortfalls.
Managers can take steps to minimize the like-
lihood of an output shortfall. In the case, where
output can be inventoried so that work can be
deferred until later, there will still be costs if there
M.V. Pauly et al.226
Copyright # 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Health Econ. 11: 221–231 (2002)
are penalties for holding higher inventories; work-
loss is the enemy of ‘just in time’ processes. But the
costs will be larger still if many customers refuse to
reschedule.
Consider ﬁrst a ﬁrm that is too small to hire
extra workers in anticipation that some fraction
m=250 will be absent each day, on average.
Therefore, it is not costless to ﬁnd a perfect
substitute. The penalty that we analyze is a
situation where the ﬁrm must pay its workers
overtime wage of ð1þ aÞw to remain after their
shift to ﬁll in for any absent colleagues in order to
ensure that Y, the target output, is produced each
day.c Over the course of the year, the ﬁrm will
expect to incur overtime costs of mð1þ aÞw due to
worker absences, where m is the expected number
of absences per worker per year. This cost will be
subtracted from each worker’s annual marginal
product when determining the wage per day paid.d
The value to the ﬁrm of reducing absenteeism by
one day per worker is ð1þ aÞw. The cost of an
absence is the marginal labor cost (wage plus
overtime) of a worker, which is higher than the
average wage per day.
Larger ﬁrms under pressure to produce a certain
output each day may be able to mitigate the eﬀects
of absenteeism. If workers were never absent, then
a ﬁrm would hire L workers to produce an output
of Y. The actual number of workers present on a
given day is L ¼ Ls  a, where Ls refers to the
number of scheduled workers and a is the number
of workers who are absent. If there were no
penalty associated with producing less than Y
and output could be stored at zero cost, then the
ﬁrm would hire Lmin ¼ ð1þm=250ÞL workers,
where m ¼ E½a – the number of days that each
worker is expected to be absent during a 250-
work-day year. If m were 10 and L were 100, for
example, a ﬁrm would hire 4% more workers than
needed (104 instead of 100) in order to produce
Y. Over a long time period, L workers would be
present for work, on average.
If the penalty associated with having fewer than
L workers each day is suﬃciently large, then a
ﬁrm might hire staﬀ in excess of Lmin. The
probability that a ﬁrm will have a shortage of
workers on a particular day is
PrðLs  a5LminÞ ¼ Prða > Ls  LminÞ
¼ ½1 Gða;Ls  LminÞ
where G is the cumulative distribution function for
absences. The number of workers who are absent
each day, a, is a random variable with a mean of m
and variance s2. The variance in the number of
workers who are present, which will be a decreas-
ing function of Ls, will dictate the magnitude of
overtime costs. A ﬁrm that schedules a large
number of workers will have less variance in the
number of workers who are present each day
relative to a small ﬁrm, and therefore, will be less
likely to incur a penalty (overtime costs in this
case).
Conditional on Y, the ﬁrm’s objective is to
choose Ls, the number of scheduled workers per
day, to minimize production costs (production
costs if there were no absences would be wLmin)
min
Ls
wðLs  LminÞ
þ ½1 Gða;Ls  LminÞð1þ aÞw ð1Þ
The ﬁrm will hire workers until gL ¼ 1=ð1þ aÞ,
where gL is the eﬀect of scheduling an additional
worker on the expected number of absent workers.
If overtime wages are twice as high as regular
wages (a ¼ 1), then a ﬁrm will hire an extra worker
if he reduces the expected number of absent
workers by at least 0.50. The cost to the ﬁrm of
an absence will be greater than w but smaller than
ð1þ aÞw (or else it would not have hired any excess
staﬀ ).
Now consider the value of a program that
reduces the absences for all workers by 1 day at a
ﬁrm that has been incurring overtime costs. When
m, the expected number of absences, is reduced by
one, the ﬁrm will adjust Lmin downward. If 104
workers had been hired in hope that 100 workers
would show up, fewer than 104 will now be hired.
In expression (1), both the expected value of a and
(Ls  Lmin) will decrease. Overtime costs should
also decrease because the variance of workers who
are present each day will fall when m falls. Table 1
presents a simple analysis of a ﬁrm that hires ten
workers. Column one presents the probability
distribution for the number of workers who will
show up each day assuming that each worker is
absent 4% of the time and absences are indepen-
dent across workers. For example, the probability
that all ten scheduled workers show up is 0.67. The
variance of the expected workforce, which is a
more important determinant of expected overtime
costs than the mean number of absences, is
presented in the bottom row of Table 1. When
absenteeism is reduced to 3% per day per worker
(a decrease of m greater than 1), the variance of
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workers falls by about 15%. This reduced variance
will result in lower overtime costs.
So far we have assumed that absences are
exogenous, and cannot be aﬀected by a ﬁrm’s sick
leave policy. More realistically, ﬁrms that incur
substantial penalties when output varies should
consider implementing stricter sick leave policies
to reduce the cost of absenteeism. The workers
would beneﬁt from such a policy in a competitive
market through the form of higher wages.
We conclude that if expected absenteeism is
reduced by 1 day per worker at a ﬁrm that had
been paying overtime, the ﬁrm will respond by
reducing staﬃng and/or reducing overtime ex-
penses, and the marginal beneﬁt of the reduced
absenteeism will be between the daily wage and the
overtime wage. For the particular case described
above the homogeneous output but time-sensitive
demand, we can conclude that, other things being
equal, large ﬁrms will suﬀer less from the work loss
of a given average or expected amount than will
smaller ﬁrms. What is truly relevant here, however,
is not ﬁrm size per se but rather the size of the
production unit. A large airline or a large hotel
chain with small geographically isolated local units
or oﬃces will have the experience of a small ﬁrm.
The full-employment case: summary
In some ﬁrms, the average wage per day can be a
reasonably accurate measure of the cost of lost
work time and the beneﬁt of reducing lost work
time. In other ﬁrms and in other situations,
however, the wage will substantially underestimate
the cost of lost work time. When will the cost of
lost work time exceed the wage and when will the
divergence between the two measures be large?
There are three factors that dictate whether the
wage will be an accurate approximation of the cost
of lost work time. Firms, or production units
within ﬁrms, can be arrayed along three dimen-
sions, as in Figure 1: the degree to which
production is team oriented rather than individual
oriented, the cost of replacing an absent worker,
and the magnitude of the penalty associated with
an output shortfall.
The wage will be a good estimate of the cost of
work loss when an absent worker can be replaced
with an equally productive substitute at the same
wage. This is true even if production is team-
oriented and there are large penalties associated
with not meeting an output target. If there is team
production but no team-speciﬁc human capital,
then absences can be oﬀset by calling in perfect
substitutes. Even if there is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
capital, a large enough ﬁrm can create a reserve
pool of employees familiar with company policies
and procedures that can ﬁll in. The cost of
replacing absent workers will be relatively large
at small ﬁrms that cannot aﬀord to create a reserve
pool to replace absent workers, ﬁrms with
substantial ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, and ﬁrms
that use teams with substantial team-speciﬁc
human capital.
The ﬁrst situation where the cost of work loss
will exceed the wage is when a ﬁrm uses an
individual production process, incurs a penalty if
they miss an output target, and perfect substitutes
are not available to replace absent workers (Case
A in Figure 1). For example, a reservation call
center that is understaﬀed due to absences will
potentially alienate customers and damage the
ﬁrm’s reputation. If the ﬁrm takes no steps to
minimize the likelihood of incurring the penalty,
the cost of work loss is assumed to be ð1þ aÞw per
worker. The ﬁrm might respond to this penalty by
overstaﬃng to minimize the likelihood of an
output shortfall, or by paying overtime to its
workers to work double shifts when necessary.
These actions will reduce the cost of work loss.
The divergence between the wage and the actual
cost of lost work time will be determined by (1) the
size of the penalty for unsatisﬁed demand; (2) the
size of the ﬁrm/unit and the variance of ﬁrm
output relative to its target; and (3) the quality and
price of substitute inputs (temps) or strategies
(overtime).
The second situation where the cost of work
loss will be larger than the wage is when there is a
team production and perfect substitutes are not
Table 1. Probability distribution of employees who are
present at a ﬁrm with ten scheduled workers
No. of employees
who are present
Daily absence
rate of 4%
Daily absence
rate of 3%
10 0.665 0.737
9 0.277 0.228
8 0.052 0.032
7 0.006 0.003
6 0.0004 0.0001
Variance of present
workers
0.620 0.539
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available to replace absent workers (Case B in
Figure 1). The maximum cost of work loss in such
a situation would be the sum of the factor prices of
all the inputs, including capital (SW in Figure 1).
This would occur when it is prohibitively expensive
to replace an absent team member so the optimal
response is to allow the entire team to be idle when
one member is absent. If the ﬁrm is able to replace
the absent worker with a less productive substi-
tute, then the cost of work loss will be smaller than
in the extreme case. The divergence between the
wage per day and the actual cost of lost work time
in Case B will be determined by (1) the impact of a
team member’s absence on team production; and
(2) the quality and price of substitute inputs, which
are related to the amount of team-speciﬁc human
capital.
Firms might have all three characteristics – team
production, diﬃculty substituting for absent work-
ers, and penalties for output shortfalls – which will
experience the largest costs of lost work. An
example might be Boeing, which uses teams to
produce airplanes. If Boeing misses a delivery
deadline it can still sell the planes, but its
reputation is damaged and future sales may be
aﬀected. While not all ﬁrms will have the crucial
combinations of characteristics described above,
there are many ﬁrms that are like Case A or B.
These concepts are related to the notion of
‘friction costs’ – the cost of replacing an absent
worker – described by Koopmanschap et al. [10].
However, in a model of competitive labor markets
in (full employment) equilibrium, friction costs are
an addition to the lost wage or productivity
measures, not a substitute for them. Moreover, if
workers make up lost output later in what would
otherwise be their spare time (or through a faster
pace of work) there is both a cost to society –
the value of sacriﬁced leisure or eﬀort, which
could even exceed the wage – and a cost to the
employer in the form of higher annual wages for
jobs that require such make up or speed up
(compared to jobs that do not). Even if physical
output (and therefore measured GDP) do not
decline when illness strikes, wellbeing does fall, so
that a proper measure of welfare (and a proper
measure of the value of human capital) should
be aﬀected. Thus, lost leisure is a cost that should
0% 100%
Team Production (as a % of firm’s production) 
Cost of a substitute
Worker of equal-quality
Wage of absent worker
Greater than the wage
Penalty for
an output
shortfall
None
Large penalty
Case A
W(1+α)
W
W
WW
ΣW (1+α)
Case B
ΣW W
Figure 1. Firm characteristics that cause the cost of work loss to be greater than the wage
(cost of work loss is displayed in bold at each vertex)
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be considered, most especially if one takes a
correct societal perspective than encompass-
ing all costs and beneﬁts that matter to the
citizens [4].
Less than full employment
How is this model altered when there is (non-
transitional) involuntary unemployment? In this
case, the employer, employee, and societal per-
spectives diverge. The societal value of avoiding a
lost workday, though almost always positive, can
fall below the prevailing money wage. Sticky
money wages or imperfect macroeconomic policy
may cause the prevailing wage to be higher than
the level that equates the quantity of labor
demanded to the quantity supplied.
In such a case, the marginal revenue product of
labor will still equal the money wage, but it will
exceed the opportunity cost of labor (the marginal
value of leisure). From the societal perspective, the
cost of lost work time is now less than the wage.
However, the cost of lost work is obviously not
zero; instead, it equals the (marginal) reservation
wage unemployed workers would require to
sacriﬁce leisure for work. In such a case, even if
the loss to an employer from a lost workday
exceeds the money wage (e.g. because of team
production), the loss to society could be less than
the money wage.
In the ﬁrm-speciﬁc health capital case, however,
the employer will still value avoiding lost work
time at the same level as in the full employment
case. Programs to reduce work loss may still add
to proﬁts.
In the case of general health capital, the annual
wage that would be paid to healthier workers is
diﬃcult to specify since the money wage is no
longer being determined in a competitive labor
market equilibrium. The question is whether, in a
time of unemployment, a set of healthier workers
could ﬁnd a market for the additional labor time
they can supply. Probably, the additional payment
would be positive but would be less than the
additional marginal revenue product.
The size of the diﬀerence between the prevailing
money wage and the (lower) wage that would
equilibrate the labor market determines the extent
of the divergence between the private (employer)
cost of work loss and the societal cost. If the
unemployment rate is only slightly elevated above
the transitional level, then the perspectives will still
be fairly similar and our earlier analysis will apply.
There could be a substantial divergence in the
perspectives if the unemployment rate is high.
However, in that case not only should lost work
time be measured diﬀerently from a societal
perspective, so also should all other medical
‘costs’. For instance, the societal opportunity cost
of a hospital stay will not be properly measured by
its accounting cost, since money wages for hospital
workers will substantially exceed the opportunity
cost of their input. In the world of high
unemployment, market prices no longer furnish a
valid compass for the societal perspective.
Our discussion here should be distinguished
from the treatment of lost wages as ‘indirect costs’
in cost-eﬀectiveness analysis (CEA) studies. In
principle, the consequences of reduced workloss
can be included either in the numerator or
denominator of a ‘cost-utility’ version of CEA,
although Gold et al. prefer to include them in the
utility eﬀect, presumably by converting wage gains
into utility or QALYs, rather than in the cost
component of the ratio [11]. Our argument here is
concerned only with monetary valuation of the
wage gains. In the full-employment case, they
should be valued at the money wage or greater. In
the less-than-full-employment case, they should be
valued at the reservation wage (equal to the value
of leisure foregone), which will often be less than
the market wage. In both cases, the wage gains will
need to be added on to the QALYs measure in
some fashion if sick leave beneﬁts are provided to
workers, but should not be added if no such
beneﬁts are furnished, in order to avoid ‘double
counting’ [12].
Conclusion
This discussion leads to three conclusions. First,
the productivity gains from programs or medical
interventions that reduce absenteeism due to
illness are very likely to be larger than the wage
per day or per hour. Second, the incidence of net
beneﬁts from such programs (value of productivity
gain less program cost) is likely to fall largely on
workers in the long run, but on employer proﬁts in
the short run. The incidence will shift more rapidly
to workers when it is easy for employers to identify
employees with improved health. And third,
employers who initiate work loss-reduction
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programs with positive net beneﬁts will be re-
warded, regardless of the incidence of these gains.
Notes
a. The word ‘almost’ is necessary because a substantial
increase in the supply of productive labor will,
depending on the elasticity of the demand for labor,
potentially reduce the wage slightly. Still, there will
be substantial gains to workers.
b. The employer may also retain the gains if the health
intervention aﬀects ‘inframarginal’ workers who,
because of seniority or high moving costs, will not
actively seek a diﬀerent job.
c. Presumably, the ﬁrm pays overtime rather than
allowing customers to walk away because the over-
time pay penalty is less than the lost business/bad
reputation penalty, or a penalty from bringing in
expensive temporary workers who do not know the
job.
d. Workers should recoup this amount in overtime
payments when they ﬁll-in for their absent colleagues.
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